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INSTITUTIONAL POLYCENTRISM, ENTREPRENEURS’ SOCIAL NETWORKS, 
AND NEW VENTURE GROWTH 
 
Abstract 
 
What is the interrelationship among formal institutions, social networks, and new venture 
growth? Drawing on the theory of institutional polycentrism and social network theory, we 
examine this question using data on 637 entrepreneurs from four different countries. We find the 
confluence of weak and inefficient formal institutions to be associated with a larger number of 
structural holes in the entrepreneurial social networks. While the effect of this institutional order 
on the revenue growth of new ventures is negative, a network’s structural holes have a positive 
effect on the revenue growth. Furthermore, the positive effect of structural holes on the revenue 
growth is stronger in an environment with a more adverse institutional order (i.e., weaker and 
more inefficient institutions). The contributions and implications of these findings are discussed. 
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Entrepreneurial ventures contribute to the economic development of nations and 
therefore, understanding the influences on the creation and growth of these ventures is of both 
theoretical and practical importance (Baumol & Strom, 2007). We know from the extant research 
that entrepreneurs often cultivate and use social networks to access resources (e.g., capital, 
knowledge, supplies) that facilitate new venture growth (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; 
Granovetter, 1995; Kim & Aldrich, 2005; Stam & Elfring, 2008; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007). Prior 
research suggests that the use of social networks is influenced by the institutional contexts (e.g., 
Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004). Institutions establish the rules of the game for 
entrepreneurial activities and thereby influence both the nature and outcomes of entrepreneurs’ 
social networks (Baumol, 1990; Boettke & Coyne, 2009; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, 
& Shleifer, 2002; Hwang & Powell, 2005; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008). The purpose of this 
research is to examine how formal institutions affect the development and use of entrepreneurs’ 
social networks and new venture growth. We employ the theory of institutional polycentrism, 
which suggests that institutions originate from multiple (poly) rule-setting centers such as 
governments, associations, and communities (Ostrom, 2010). 
Although there has been a considerable amount of research on the effects of specific 
institutions (e.g., political risk) on particular managerial decisions, institutions are complex and 
multifaceted (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Kogut & Ragin, 
2006) and their effects on firm actions are interdependent (Delmas & Toffel, 2009; Hitt, 
Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004). The theory of institutional polycentrism 
postulates that institutional environments are characterized by multiplicity, which is defined as 
the confluence of different types of interrelated institutions (Ostrom, 2005a). The confluence of 
multiple institutions is theorized to have qualitatively different effects on outcomes than a single 
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institution or several institutions because the confluence characterizes dynamic interaction, 
mutual reinforcement, and a cointegrated and non-separable nature of diverse institutional rules 
and norms within the entire institutional order (Ostrom, 2005a; 2005b; Ostrom, Schroeder, & 
Wynne, 1993). On the contrary, a single institution, or several institutions may not affect 
entrepreneurial growth directly, and therefore, alone are less relevant for new ventures at early 
stages of development (Tzeng, Beamish & Chen, 2011). The confluence of political, regulatory, 
and economic institutions affect outcomes in interdependent and composite manners partly due 
to their common historical, geographic, and cultural foundations (Acemoglu, Johnson, & 
Robinson, 2005; Amable, 2003; Greif & Tabellini, 2010; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hall & Thelen, 
2009; Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2012; Ostrom, 1986; 2005a; 2010; Sobel & Coyne, 
2011). In contrast to the previous research that mainly explored the influence of a single 
institution or regulatory, normative and cognitive pillars of national institutions separately 
(Busenitz, Gomez, & Spencer, 2000; Fogel, Hawk, Morck, & Yeung, 2006), we examine the 
effects of the confluence of multiple (political, regulatory, and economic) institutions on 
entrepreneurs’ networks and new venture growth. 
The theory of institutional polycentrism further suggests that the confluence of weak and 
inefficient institutions motivates social actors to use their networks as substitutions for the lack 
of institutional support because loose-knit networks help them to acquire resources from 
informal resource holders who partially operate outside the formal institutional arrangements 
(Ostrom et al., 1993; Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009.).1 In this 
way, the confluence of weak and inefficient institutions and social networks affects outcomes 
1  From the perspective of institutional polycentrism, a weak institution involves one or more institutional 
rules that is unable to achieve its intended goals and objectives (e.g., weak political and economic institutions) 
whereas an inefficient institution is an interventionist institution that increases the transaction costs of economic 
activities (e.g., inefficient regulatory institutions) (Ostrom et al., 1993; Shleifer, 2005). 
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including entrepreneurial growth in synergistic ways (Ostrom, 2005b). Therefore, we focus on 
two concepts of the theory of institutional polycentrism to explain entrepreneurs’ networks and 
venture growth: multiplicity of different types of institutions (e.g., political, regulatory, and 
economic) and institutional substitution. We posit that institutional multiplicity characterizes the 
institutional environment that exerts influence on entrepreneurial networks and ventures, 
whereas institutional substitution is a mechanism through which entrepreneurs’ networks 
compensate for weak and inefficient institutions thus enhancing their effect on new venture 
growth. 
Extending the theory of institutional polycentrism and integrating it with social network 
theory, we examine the following four questions: (a) Does the confluence of weak and inefficient 
political, regulatory, and economic institutions affect the development of a network’s structural 
holes (the absence of a link between two contacts who are both linked to an actor)? (b) Does the 
confluence of weak and inefficient political, regulatory, and economic institutions affect new 
venture growth? (c) Do structural holes in entrepreneurs’ networks affect new venture growth? 
(d) Does the confluence of weak and inefficient political, regulatory, and economic institutions 
moderate the relationship between network’s structural holes and new venture growth? We 
explore these questions using structured interview data from 637 new venture firms founded in 
one of four nations (China, France, Russia, and the United States) that display varying and 
unique institutional orders (World Bank, 2010). 
The contributions of this study are threefold. First, by employing the relatively new 
concepts “institutional multiplicity” and “institutional substitution” to explain entrepreneurs’ 
networks and growth of new ventures, we integrate and systematize disparate ideas on 
polycentric institutions to develop a cohesive theory of institutional polycentrism. This 
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represents a contribution to institutional theory and research. Second, this study contributes to 
institution-based comparative research on entrepreneurship, contributing to our understanding of 
new venture growth by using an integrated perspective on institutional polycentrism and social 
networks (Cumming, Sapienza, Siegel, & Wright, 2009; Lerner & Schoar, 2010). Finally, 
structural holes in entrepreneurs’ networks enable them to access informal resource holders when 
the formal institutional order is adverse for entrepreneurs. As such, this research provides a 
contribution to our knowledge on the contingent value of networks (Brass et al., 2004; Burt, 
1992). 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Institutional Polycentrism Theory 
The notion of “polycentricity” refers to a spontaneous order in which multiple and 
independent decision-making centers and actors make mutual adjustments for ordering their 
relations within a general framework of rules and norms (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, 1961; 
Polanyi, 1951). In this sense, polycentricity is the extent to which the adjustment of each actor in 
the order is related in a certain manner to the adjustment of every one of these actors to each of 
the others. The totality of these spontaneous interactions and adjustments represents a 
polycentric order (Aligica & Tarko, 2012). 
The concept “institutional polycentricity” denotes spontaneous interactions of multiple 
institutional rules and norms, and mutual adjustments among institutional actors. Social actors, 
including organizations and individuals, pursue their goals in polycentric institutional settings 
where they comply with multiple governance rules at different levels and scales embedded in 
local knowledge and particular settings (Ostrom, 1990). Therefore, polycentric institutional order 
is a complex system of governance in which authorities from overlapping jurisdictions (or 
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“centers” of authority) interact to determine the conditions and constraints under which units of 
governance, e.g., organizations and individuals, act legitimately (MgGinnis, 2011). 
The Institutional Polycentrism theory defines polycentric institutions as multiple, 
configurational, and context-specific institutional rules and norms that originate from, are 
situated in, and are enforced by numerous decision-making power centers. Therefore, polycentric 
institutional order is a self-coordinating spontaneous system that results from the interplay of 
multiple, complex, recombined, and particular context-embedded rules and norms, and the 
interchanges among numerous interdependent institutional actors (Hayek, 1973; Ostrom, 1999a; 
Polanyi, 1951). Thus, the main theoretical postulates of institutional polycentrism are 
institutional multiplicity, institutional configuration, and institutional context-specificity (Greif, 
2006; Hall & Thelen, 2009; Ostrom, 1986; 2005a; 2010). 
In this study, we examine the roles of institutional multiplicity and institutional substitution, 
two key dimensions of institutional polycentrism, in the development of entrepreneurs’ networks 
and venture growth. Institutional multiplicity as a confluence of institutions is defined as 
dynamic interplay, mutual reinforcement and cointegrated nature of diverse rules and norms in 
which the effect of change in one rule and norm or a set of rules and norms is contingent upon 
other rules and norms in-use (Ostrom, 2011). Institutional substitution is a process in which 
weak (e.g., non-enforced) and inefficient rules lead to the rise of alternative sets of rules, norms, 
and networks that compensate for their lack of influence and usefulness (Crouch, 2005; Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; North, 1990; 2005; Ostrom et al., 1993). Thus, substitution is a process in which 
one set of formal institutions and informal networks is used to replace or overcome the 
debilitating effects from multiple weak and inefficient institutions (Deeg, 2005; Hall & Soskice, 
2001). 
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Confluence of Weak and Inefficient Institutions and Network’s Structural Holes 
The combination of weak and inefficient national-level institutions enhances the 
importance of informal norms and networks (Holmes et al., 2012; Ostrom, 2005a; 2005b). When 
national institutions are weak and inefficient, many more formal and informal institutions must 
be considered by managers, and such a context generates uncertainty and ambiguity as to which 
is the most relevant institution or set of institutions for given situations (Heberer, 2003). The 
authority for rule making and enforcement becomes more diffused and sometimes difficult to 
identify. These conditions create special challenges for entrepreneurs with new ventures, who 
need to identify what is needed to achieve legitimacy and to access resources for survival and 
growth. However, when national formal institutions are stronger and more efficient, they often 
take precedence over other lower-level institutions and are also more likely to be congruent with 
informal institutions (e.g., social norms), thereby creating an environment of lower uncertainty 
and ambiguity (Holmes et al., 2012). 
The confluence of multiple weak and inefficient institutions creates an institutional order 
in which negative change in one rule or sets of rules triggers negative changes in other rules in-
use due to the cointegrated and interdependent nature of institutions (Ostrom, 2005a; Sobel & 
Coyne, 2011). This catalytic process results in negative reinforcement across the institutions 
(Schneider & Karcher, 2010; Wilson & Herzberg, 2000), increased conflicts between various 
institutions (Hancke, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2010; Seo & Creed, 2002), and institutional 
deterioration leading weak and inefficient institutions to become even weaker and more 
inefficient (Acemoglu et al., 2005; North & Shirley, 2008). These destructive interdependent 
processes make the entire institutional order adverse for entrepreneurs motivating them to build 
diverse networks rich in structural holes as informal substitute channels for resource acquisition 
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(Batjargal, 2006; Kharkhordin & Gerber, 1994; Sedaitis, 1998; Webb et al., 2009; Xin & Pearce, 
1996).  
Networks rich in structural holes facilitate venture growth because entrepreneurs use 
them to gain access to non-redundant information and resources and to obtain social support 
(Batjargal, 2007a; Burt, 1992; Stam & Elfring, 2008). Additionally, the positive effect of 
network’s structural holes on venture growth is stronger when the confluence of weak and 
inefficient institutions creates an adverse institutional order forcing entrepreneurs to reach out to 
informal resource holders who largely operate beyond the formal institutional arrangements 
(Nee, 2005; Ostrom, 2005b; Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). 
 Each type of weak and inefficient institution generates forms of institutional uncertainty 
and ambiguity such as uncertainty regarding access to financial resources or the ability to 
transact efficiently (Feldmann, 2007; Sobel, Clark, & Lee, 2007). When one set of institutions is 
weak, yet there may be other types of relatively strong institutions; social actors rely on the 
stronger institutions to mitigate the negative consequences of the dysfunctional ones (Herrmann, 
2008). For example, when labor market institutions are weak but government employment 
policies are likely to be relatively strong, which offset the negative externalities of the 
dysfunctional labor market institutions (Wulfgramm, 2011). In this way, the negative 
implications of one type of weak and inefficient institution are less detrimental for entrepreneurs 
if there are other stronger and more efficient institutions that compensate for the deficiencies 
(Heberer, 2003). However, when there is a confluence of different types of weak and inefficient 
formal institutions, the negative synergy makes the entire formal institutional environment highly 
uncertain for entrepreneurs because there is little or no formal institutional support of which they 
can be assured (Boettke, Coyne, & Leeson, 2008; Fogel et al., 2006; Ovaska & Sobel, 2005; 
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Wilson & Herzberg, 2000). The cumulative effects of the negative synergy among weak and 
inefficient institutions increase the strategic value of diverse entrepreneurial networks rich in 
structural holes (Batjargal, 2000; 2003a; 2007a; Heberer, 2003; Sedaitis, 1998; Xin & Pearce, 
1996). 
Political institutional systems that lack democratic checks and balances tend to be weak 
and unstable, resulting in distrust among social actors including entrepreneurs in such institutions 
(Ledeneva, 1998). These political institutions often disadvantage those groups that are not 
members of the ruling political parties and clans (Tsai, 2007). The mistrust of public institutions 
result in the development of diverse private networks that serve as alternative channels for 
information exchange, resources, and social support (Tsai, 2002). The real and perceived 
institutional discrimination motivates entrepreneurs to build non-redundant networks as safety 
nets (Batjargal, 2003b; Ostrom, 2005a). The concentration of political power in the executive 
branches of the government leaves the judicial authorities weak (Shleifer, 2005). These 
conditions increase transaction costs for entrepreneurs causing them to use private channels, for 
example, trusted intermediaries, through which they can complete important transactions 
(McMillan & Woodruff, 1999). 
Weak economic institutions (e.g., institutions responsible for capital availability and 
market liquidity) directly and indirectly influence entrepreneurs’ network structures (Aldrich & 
Ruef, 2006; Batjargal, 2006). For example, a shortage of loans and investment funds for new 
startup ventures motivates entrepreneurs to search for financial resources from diverse sources 
such as business angels, neighborhood credit associations, and other informal financial networks 
(McMillan & Woodruff, 1999; Tsai, 2002). Further, money market illiquidity and inflexible 
exchange rates disadvantage new ventures disproportionately. Therefore, entrepreneurs mobilize 
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bridging ties in their networks to overcome these difficulties generated by weak economic 
institutions (Batjargal, 2005; Stam & Elfring, 2008). 
Interventionist regulatory institutions (e.g., overly bureaucratic registration procedures) 
produce a great deal of institutional inefficiencies that increase entrepreneurs’ transaction and 
opportunity costs (Ardagna & Lusardi, 2010; Ostrom, 2005b; World Bank, 2010). These 
inefficiencies force entrepreneurs to employ particular network-based strategies (e.g., relational 
contracting) to reduce transaction costs (McMillan & Woodruff, 1999). Networks rich in 
structural holes enable entrepreneurs to obtain permissions, licenses, and quotas and to re-
enforce contracts and curb the predatory prerogatives of the government because these ties serve 
as bridges to valuable contacts in distant social clusters (Batjargal, 2003a; 2003b; Frye, 2000; 
Frye & Shleifer, 1997). 
The confluence of weak and inefficient political, economic, and regulatory rules heighten 
the value of diverse and loose-knit networks through several mechanisms such as the dynamics 
associated with negative mutual reinforcement and synergy (Schneider & Karcher, 2010; Wilson 
& Herzberg, 2000), increased institutional conflicts and contradictions (Hancke, 2010; Pache & 
Santos, 2010; Seo & Creed, 2002), and institutional deterioration and reversals (Acemoglu et al., 
2005; North & Shirley, 2008). The distrust in political institutions enhances entrepreneurs’ 
reliance on network-based strategies and tactics that are used to cope with weak economic 
institutions and inefficient regulations (Spicer & Pyle, 2002). The chronic financial 
disadvantages generated by inferior economic institutions justify and perpetuate obtaining 
financial and other tangible resources from network ties, which are cultivated often for purposes 
of circumventing the intrusive regulatory institutions (Malesky & Taussig, 2009; World Bank, 
2010). Weak legal protections through the court system together with the predatory inclinations 
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of government bureaucracies often make informal channels of protection the primary and 
perhaps the only alternative available to entrepreneurs (Volkov, 2002). The legal and 
administrative restrictions on business activities in combination with frequent shortages of cash, 
foreign currency and supplies compel entrepreneurs to rely to a greater degree on loose-knit 
personal networks (Tsai, 2002). 
The combination of weak and inefficient institutions serves as a catalyst for conflicts 
within the institutional system (Hancke, 2010). For example, burdensome regulations clash with 
market-based economic institutions that require relative freedom and strong legal foundations to 
operate effectively (Bjornskov & Foss, 2008; Nee, 2005a; 2005b; North & Shirley, 2008). 
Inefficient (often contradictory) regulations exacerbate institutional confusion and impose 
competing demands on organizations that can be especially challenging for new firms (Pache & 
Santos, 2010). The amalgamation of weak and inefficient institutions often lack conflict 
resolution mechanisms, thereby potentially escalating disputes among different actors (Ostrom, 
2005a). The series of weak and inefficient institutions often result in institutional deterioration 
that increases the risk in the institutional context for entrepreneurs (Acemoglu et al., 2005; North 
& Shirley, 2008). The frequent policy reversals precipitate constant rule changes that amplify 
institutional uncertainty. 
Thus, the negative synergy, institutional conflicts, and institutional deterioration generate 
risky and adverse institutional environments for entrepreneurs (Guseva & Rona-Tas, 2001; 
North, 1990; World Bank, 2010). As a result, entrepreneurs are forced to cultivate networks rich 
in structural holes to cope with the adversity and to access resources (North, 1990). These 
negative institutional processes heighten the value and utility of entrepreneurial networks rich in 
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structural holes (Ostrom, 1990; 2005b); entrepreneurs use networks as substitutes for the weak 
and inefficient formal institutions. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The confluence of weak and inefficient institutions has a positive effect on 
entrepreneurial network’s structural holes (i.e. entrepreneurs’ networks have more structural 
holes). 
 
Confluence of Weak and Inefficient Institutions and New Venture Growth 
 A single weak or inefficient institution can adversely influence revenue growth of young 
firms (Frye & Shleifer, 1997). However, the combination of multiple weak and inefficient 
institutions has a strong cumulative negative effect on revenue growth because these institutions 
reinforce one another’s harmful effects (Schneider & Karcher, 2010; Wilson & Herzberg, 2000), 
impose contradictory demands on new firms (Pache & Santos, 2010), and tend to be unstable 
(North & Shirley, 2008; Sobel & Coyne, 2011). The negative influences of weak and diffuse 
institutions increase the challenges of identifying growth opportunities, create higher transaction 
costs, and constrain access to resources. In doing so, the confluence of these institutions makes it 
difficult to develop effective sales and marketing strategies, especially for new venture firms. 
These problems are reflected in lower revenue growth (Boettke et al., 2008; Fogel et al., 2006; 
Ostrom, 2005a; Ovaska & Sobel, 2005). 
Weak political institutions often impose restrictions on social activities that in turn hinder 
entrepreneurial opportunity identification and innovation (Batjargal, 2007a; Tsai, 2007). Weak 
political institutions and bureaucratic regulatory controls tend to result in corruption and bribery 
that hinder entrepreneurs’ risk taking (Tonoyan, Strohmeyer, Habib, & Perlitz, 2010). Under 
these conditions, new ventures are less likely to grow. 
Inefficient regulatory (including legal) institutions often result in insecure property and 
contractual rights, which negatively influences both growth incentives and intentions because 
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entrepreneurs are unsure of their ability to obtain and retain adequate returns from the venture’s 
strategic actions (e.g., introduction of new product) (Baumol, 1990; Desai, Gompers, & Lerner, 
2005; Frye & Shleifer, 1997). The overly bureaucratic rules redirect managers’ attention, time, 
and energies away from revenue generation activities and thereby increase overall opportunity 
costs (World Bank, 2010).  
Weak economic institutions are especially harmful to young firms because they constrain 
entrepreneurs’ access to equity and debt capital (Batjargal & Liu, 2004; Malesky & Taussig, 
2009). The limited supply of funds for capital investment reduces operating working capital 
available for production and services, thereby restricting revenue growth (LeLarge, Sraer, & 
Thesmar, 2010). Similarly, a shortage of or restrictions on the use of foreign currency hamper 
new ventures’ ability to import new technologies, product components, and raw materials and to 
sell their products in overseas markets (Tsai, 2002). The combination of weak and inefficient 
institutions results in negative synergy because of destructive mutual reinforcement and 
increased institutional contradictions and reversals that disrupt venture growth processes and 
trajectories (North & Shirley, 2008). Based on these arguments, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2: The confluence of weak and inefficient institutions has a negative effect on 
the revenue growth of new ventures. 
 
Network’s Structural Holes and New Venture Growth 
As an alternative channel for resource acquisition, a network’s structural holes enable 
entrepreneurs to access informal resource holders who partially operate beyond the formal 
institutional arrangements, e.g., overseas informal investors (Batjargal, 2007a; Burt, 1992). In 
contrast, dense networks with fewer structural holes connect entrepreneurs with local resource 
holders who often operate within the given institutional order (Granovetter, 1995). 
Entrepreneurial networks rich in structural holes facilitate a new venture’s revenue growth 
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through six mechanisms: access to non-redundant information, knowledge, and referrals; 
brokerage; access to tangible resources; structural autonomy; social and emotional support; and 
the transitivity mechanism (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973; 1995; Stam & Elfring, 2008; Stuart & 
Sorenson, 2007). 
Loose-knit and diverse networks rich in structural holes enable entrepreneurs to obtain 
non-redundant private information about sales opportunities, e.g., information about new market 
segments for existing products, new products for current clients, and new distribution channels in 
a timely fashion because these networks serve as bridging ties to distant clients (Batjargal, 
2010a; Stam & Elfring, 2008; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007). The sales referrals and 
recommendations from trusted ties generate higher revenues, and interpersonal trust and 
expectations between entrepreneurs and referees are likely to transfer to the third-parties (e.g., 
new clients) (Castilla, Hwang, Granovetter, & Granovetter, 2000). The relational trust lubricates 
and speeds up the sales processes of customization, pricing, delivery, and after-sales services 
(Uzzi, 1997). 
Brokerage is a process by which intermediary actors facilitate transactions between other 
actors lacking access to or trust in one another. The brokers generate returns each time they 
broker an exchange (Marsden, 1982). Entrepreneurs can benefit in these cases by serving as 
intermediaries between potential suppliers and customers from distant network clusters (Burt, 
1992).  
The bridging ties to different social clusters enhance entrepreneurs’ access to diverse 
tangible resources (Batjargal, 2010b; Stam & Elfring, 2008). Having access to a broader set of 
resources increases the probability that the entrepreneur will have access to the type and amount 
of resources needed at any given time. The increased flows of money, materials, and 
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technologies enable entrepreneurs to formulate and execute more aggressive sales and marketing 
strategies that stabilize or enhance revenue streams and make income growth sustainable over 
the longer term (Batjargal & Liu, 2004). 
An important but sometimes overlooked mechanism through which structural holes 
generate benefits is the relative structural autonomy that low-density networks generate. 
Entrepreneurs who rely on disconnected network clusters are less dependent on a few powerful 
network members (e.g., suppliers and customers), who might attempt to exercise control over the 
entrepreneur. The structural independence gives entrepreneurs freedom to act on revenue 
opportunities without compromising their sources of resources and support (Burt, 1992). 
Structural holes can also provide potential socio-emotional benefits to entrepreneurs from 
the diverse ties. The different people who populate entrepreneurs’ networks, such as mentors, 
friends, and family members, each satisfy different socio-emotional needs of entrepreneurs 
(Carsrud, Gaglio, & Olm, 1987). While mentors provide encouragement for business 
achievements, friends and family help entrepreneurs to cope with work-related stress and the 
competitive pressures endemic to entrepreneurial ventures. Importantly, disconnected support 
networks make it less likely that social problems and the challenges that they generate migrate 
from work to families and from families to work. In this sense, loose-knit networks serve as a 
buffer or protection for entrepreneurs. This situation promotes enhanced confidence, 
commitment, and psychic resources on the part of the entrepreneurs, thereby better enabling 
them to concentrate on revenue generation activities (Krueger & Dickson, 1994). 
The last mechanism that facilitates revenue growth is transitivity of network triads. When 
the entrepreneur connects and integrates two trusted contacts from distant network clusters, 
positive outcomes, such as the integration of different knowledge stocks and resources, access to 
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venture capital, and alliance creation, can occur (Batjargal, 2007b; Granovetter, 1973). These 
outcomes have the potential to contribute to higher revenue growth in entrepreneurial ventures. 
For example, the combination of different knowledge stocks and/or other resources potentially 
allows the firm to identify and exploit a new market opportunity. 
Summarizing these arguments, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3: Entrepreneurial network’s structural holes have a positive effect on the 
revenue growth of new ventures. 
 
The Moderating Role of the Confluence of Weak and Inefficient Institutions 
The effects of an entrepreneurial network’s structural holes on revenue growth are greater 
when the confluence of weak and inefficient institutions creates an adverse institutional order 
with which entrepreneurs must cope. More specifically, we expect that networks rich in 
structural holes serve as substitutions for weak and inefficient formal institutions helping 
entrepreneurs to access informal resource holders who operate beyond the formal institutional 
arrangements (Deeg, 2005; Nee, 2005; Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). The resources accessed from these 
sources are generally helpful but they have greater importance and are critical to enhancing 
venture growth when the formal institutions are weak and inefficient. 
The institutional environment represents an important component of the context within 
which new venture firms must operate and seek growth. While a single weak institution or 
several inefficient institutions may have small or negligible effects on entrepreneurial growth 
(Tzeng et al., 2011), the confluence of multiple weak and inefficient institutions creates a hostile 
institutional context for entrepreneurs due to the negative synergy among the various institutions 
(e.g., negative reinforcement, and institutional conflicts and deterioration) (Volkov, 2002). The 
adverse institutional order results in more challenging opportunity identification, high transaction 
costs, constrained access to resources, and inadequate sales strategies. Under these conditions, 
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entrepreneurs need to mobilize their personal networks as alternative channels to increase 
revenues because the formal institutional support available is deficient (Boettke et al., 2008; 
Heberer, 2003). The diverse networks rich in structural holes substitute for the functions 
generally provided by institutions and thereby enable entrepreneurs to recognize new revenue 
opportunities efficiently (e.g., cost effectively), reduce transaction and opportunity costs, access 
financial and material resources from informal channels, and support their actions to formulate 
and execute sales-marketing strategies (Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2008; Aoki, 1994; 
Batjargal, 2010a; Granovetter, 1995; Tsai, 2002; Webb, Kistruck, Ireland, & Ketchen, 2010). 
Thus, personal networks compensate for the deficiencies of multiple weak and inefficient 
institutions. As a result, the networks become even more important in the context of an adverse 
institutional order and thus, entrepreneurs depend more heavily on them under these conditions. 
Networks supplement or supplant weak and inefficient rules and prescriptions when the 
goals, intentions, and expectations of formal institutional actors and entrepreneurs are 
incompatible and conflicting (Estrin & Prevezer, 2011). One pervasive outcome of weak and 
inefficient institutions is rampant corruption, in which formal institutional actors (rule makers 
and enforcers) become personal rent-seekers (Baumol, 1990; Boettke et al., 2008). And, when 
formal institutions are antagonistic, a reliable protection is trusted social relationships (Ostrom & 
Ahn, 2009). Diverse network ties can be used for protection when the intentions and behaviors of 
multiple institutional actors and entrepreneurs are hostile (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). For 
example, by mobilizing members of their dispersed networks, entrepreneurs may be able to 
avoid paying illegal fees and bribes and to secure their property (Batjargal, 2003; Li, Meng, 
Wang, & Zhou, 2008; Volkov, 2002). The transaction costs of using ties as protection can 
sometimes be high, but the costs are lower than acquiescing to the corruption. And, these ties 
 
 
19 
 
will allow entrepreneurs to enhance their venture’s growth while simultaneously avoiding the 
costs emanating from corrupt practices.  
Thus, the combination of weak and inefficient institutions leads to greater returns from 
networks for entrepreneurs. In other words, this type of institutional environment enhances the 
importance of and the value created from entrepreneurial networks. Specifically, the confluence 
of weak and inefficient institutional rules enhances the positive effects of network’s structural 
holes on revenue growth of new ventures. Thus we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 4: The confluence of weak and inefficient institutions positively moderates the 
effect of network’s structural holes on revenue growth of new ventures. The positive 
relationship between structural holes and revenue growth is stronger in a more adverse 
institutional order due to the confluence of weak and inefficient institutions. 
 
METHODS 
Country Institutional Polycenticity 
 We chose China, Russia, France and the United States (U.S.) as country contexts for this 
study for the following reasons. First, the four nations indicate varying confluences of different 
political, regulatory, and economic institutions for entrepreneurship (World Bank, 2010). China 
combines communist political institutions, a mixed legal system of communist and German laws, 
and hybrid economic institutions of state, collective, and private ownership. In contrast, Russia 
blends semi-democratic political institutions, a former socialist judicial structure, and a 
transitioning over-regulated market economy. The French institutional system is comprised of 
European political institutions with a powerful presidency, a civil law tradition, and a 
coordinated market economy. Lastly, the United States has liberal presidential political 
institutions, a common law system, and a liberal market economy. Second, the institutional order 
in each country represents a unique configuration of institutions where each type of institution 
has a different weight and influence within the whole system. For example, the political 
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institutions have a relative dominance over other types of institutions in China (Nee, 2005; Xu, 
2011) whereas in Russia, the bureaucratic regulatory institutions have a great deal of influence 
on economic and social institutions (Shleifer, 2005). In contrast, the social welfare institutions 
have a strong weight within the national system in France, and the market-based economic 
institutions have a strong influence on political and regulatory institutions in the United States. 
Third, the evolutionary trajectories of multiple institutions in each country differ. For example, in 
China, while the political institutions preserve the status quo, the private property-based market 
institutions are growing stronger. In Russia, there is an increasing gap between predatory 
bureaucracies and private-property based institutions (Batjargal, 2007c). The social welfare 
system in France is expanding thereby placing increasing pressure on the financial institutions. In 
the United States, a tenuous balance between the political, regulatory and economic institutions 
is maintained due to the country’s legal system and mature institutions. Thus, the different 
institutional confluence, configuration, and evolutionary trajectories in these countries provide a 
useful setting in which to test the theoretical ideas based on institutional polycentricity. 
Sample, Procedure, and Survey Data 
We conducted structured telephone interviews with 205 Chinese, 105 French, 172 
Russian, and 155 U.S. entrepreneurs. The Chinese and Russian data were collected in summer 
and fall of 2005, the American data were collected in winter 2006 and spring 2007, and the 
French data were collected in winter and spring 2007. 
A particular challenge in international entrepreneurship research is to achieve 
methodological and sampling equivalence across international contexts (Cumming et al., 2009). 
We adopted the following seven sampling criteria and procedures. First, we identified 
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entrepreneurs in each country and city using various information sources.2 In the U.S., 
entrepreneurs were identified through the Dun and Bradstreet database and through minority and 
women business directories in Texas and Arizona. In Russia and China, there is no equivalent of 
the Dun and Bradstreet database. Therefore, the sample was derived from a number of data 
sources: government-created databases, telephone directories, and specialized business 
directories in Beijing and Moscow. In France, entrepreneurs were identified from entrepreneurs’ 
associations (e.g., Centre des Jeunes Dirigeants and Club des Entrepreneurs) and leading 
business school alumni directories.3 Although the use of various information sources makes 
sampling less systematic, this approach enabled us to identify more and diverse ventures, and 
arguably, made the sample more random because various databases and directories are likely to 
counterbalance one another’s biases.4 Second, we over-sampled women entrepreneurs in each 
country because women entrepreneurs are relatively fewer than men entrepreneurs around the 
world (Langowitz & Minniti, 2007). Third, we tried to avoid sampling low-growth intention 
2  The complete list of all information sources in Chinese, Russian, French, and English is available upon 
request. 
3  Centre des Jeunes Dirigeants and Club des Entrepreneurs are two of the largest and most active 
entrepreneurial associations in France, and they operate mostly in large cities like Paris. 
4  The usage of many different information sources for identification of the sample populations of new 
ventures is necessary in the emerging economies for the following reasons. First, in China and Russia, there are no 
complete, systematic and well-established databases of new ventures. If there are some, the access to them is limited 
for scholars, in particular, for those scholars based in the West. Therefore, researchers are forced to use only publicly 
available information sources. Second, in the emerging economies, certain types of enterprise databases, company 
directories, and membership lists of associations are likely to be biased in some dimensions because the purposes of 
creating databases and directories differ from organization to organization. For example, local governments may set 
up databases for collecting taxes, and for policy purposes like promotion of women’s entrepreneurship or high tech 
entrepreneurship. The specialized directories of women’s business associations, for example, “Women entrepreneurs 
in Beijing’s Zhongguancun high tech district”, will list only those women entrepreneurs who are active members of 
associations, clubs, and other organizations. The databases of venture capital and consulting companies (e.g., 
Zero2ipo) in China are likely to list firms in certain industries (e.g., IT or nanotechnology) or high-growth firms. In 
addition, many databases and directories contain information about those ventures which were registered in that city 
or location, and may not have information of those ventures which were registered somewhere else but operate 
mainly in that city. For example, when we collected the interview data in Beijing and Moscow, we realized that there 
were many ventures which were registered somewhere else but operate mainly in Beijing and Moscow. These 
ventures were not listed on any of the local government-run databases but come up on other directories. Therefore, 
the usage of various information sources is likely to counterbalance systematic biases of different databases and 
directories and make the sample more random and balanced. Third, the World Bank researchers adopted a similar 
approach by using multiple information sources, and found that this approach is valid (Djankov, Qian, Roland & 
Zhuravskaya, 2006). 
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“life-style” start-ups, self-employed sole entrepreneurs, and necessity-based, survival-type 
ventures, in particular, in the emerging economies of China and Russia (Langowitz & Minniti, 
2007). Therefore, we interviewed entrepreneurs in large metropolitan areas including Beijing, 
Moscow, Houston, Phoenix, and Paris. Fourth, the firm had to be eight years old or younger, in 
line with previous research on new ventures (Zahra, 1996). Fifth, the firm could not be a 
franchise, subsidiary, or spin-off of an established organization (to ensure that the venture has 
true financial and managerial independence). Sixth, each new venture must have domestic 
ownership (i.e., no foreign stake in the venture). Seventh, each respondent had to be a majority 
owner of a firm with a decision-making role (e.g., CEO). 
In China, 817 ventures met our sampling criteria. We successfully contacted 513 firms 
but could not reach the remaining 304 ventures. The response rate was 40 percent in China (205 
firms responded). In Russia, 652 ventures met the sampling criteria. We were able to contact 507 
firms but could not reach the remaining 145 firms. The response rate was 30 percent in Russia 
(172 firms responded). The response rates in France and United States were 37 percent (105 
firms) and 30 percent (155 firms), respectively. The overall response rate of 35 percent (637 
responded out of 1,820 contacted) compares favorably with most network surveys (Marsden, 
1990). More than 80 percent of entrepreneurs stated that high growth is the most important goal. 
This confirms that the majority of the ventures are high-growth-intention startups. 
Trained interviewers conducted telephone interviews with a specially designed 
questionnaire. The survey instrument was first developed in English and then translated into 
Chinese, Russian, and French. We employed back translation to ensure equivalence in the survey 
questions across the four countries. As this is a cross-level study, we collected institutional data 
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at the country level, social network data at the individual level, and venture growth data at the 
firm level (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, & Mathieu, 2007). 
Measures 
Independent variables. In this study, we used the strength-weakness composite 
institutional variable to capture the confluence of weak and inefficient political, regulatory and 
economic institutions at the national level. The partial least squares (PLS) analytical tool 
provided differential weights for each component within the composite (latent) variable. We 
focus on national institutions because they provide a general framework within which sub-
national level institutions are nested and embedded (Ostrom, 2005a). Data on formal institutions 
was obtained by gathering information on country-level political, regulatory, and economic 
environments. We used the data from Holmes et al. (2012) and the output of an exploratory 
factor analysis of the institutional variables that they completed (Appendix A). The data were 
reduced to 20 variables, which loaded upon four factors - political democracy, regulatory control, 
capital availability, and market liquidity, as noted in Appendix B. Political democracy reflects 
the means through which government officials and other individuals enact changes in formal 
institutions. Regulatory institutions establish and enforce laws and policies that govern business 
activities. Capital availability influences the investment decisions of organizations and 
individuals by affecting both their access to capital and its value. Market liquidity captures a 
country’s liabilities, exchange rate, and liquidity. To measure institutional weakness/inefficiency, 
the factors political democracy, capital availability, and market liquidity were reverse coded. The 
regulatory control institutions variable stands in contrast. Although some legal and regulatory 
protections are desirable for entrepreneurs, overly bureaucratic rules and procedures can be 
onerous and highly inefficient, especially for entrepreneurs. In effect, such rules and policies 
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greatly increase the transaction costs and opportunity costs for entrepreneurs. A higher 
institutional score reflects a greater confluence of weak and inefficient formal institutions. The 
latent variable, Institutions, was then created using the factors, where political democracy (0.90), 
regulatory control (0.99), capital availability (0.84), and market liquidity (0.89) load positively in 
the partial least squares (PLS) analysis. 
We used this measurement for the following reasons. First, the operationalization and 
measurement is consistent with the concept of institutional multiplicity. We examine one form of 
institutional multiplicity: confluence of various types of institutions (political, regulatory, and 
economic). Second, this measurement enables us to examine the effects of national-level formal 
institutions on outcomes in a composite and cointegrated manner. Therefore, the measurement is 
consistent with theoretical arguments and this study’s goals.  
We used the name generator method (Burt, 1992; Marsden, 1990) to obtain data on 
entrepreneur’s personal (egocentric) networks involving three different network contents: 
business advice, business resource, and emotional support. We employed the name generator 
method because it enables us to measure structural properties of networks (i.e., density and 
structural holes) more thoroughly while being less likely to suffer from social desirability bias 
than other methods, including the position generator method. Each respondent was asked to 
provide the first names or the surnames of up to five individuals in his or her network from 
whom he or she obtained advice (e.g., information and suggestions), business resources (e.g., 
finances, supplies, etc.), and emotional support in the last six months.5 Each contact was named 
only once in one of three network contents. For each contact, respondents also answered: “how 
5  In order to preserve the anonymity and confidentiality of network contacts, we asked the Chinese 
respondents to provide surnames of their contacts, e.g., Wang, or Li, and the American, French, and Russian 
respondents to provide first names, e.g., Peter, Helen, or Anne-Marie. This is because surnames are common but first 
names are unique in China, whereas in Russia, France, and United States, first names are common but surnames are 
unique. 
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close do you feel to this person” as “very close,” “close,” “neither close not distant,” or “distant.” 
Similarly, the respondent reported his/her perception of the relationship between two pairs of 
contacts as “close,” “neither close nor distant,” or “distant”. “Distant” was defined as “two 
individuals rarely work together, are strangers, or do not enjoy each other’s company.” We used 
Burt’s (1992) measure of network constraint to capture structural holes: 
, q  
where   is the proportion of total relational strength that i directly allocates to j, is the 
proportion of total relational strength that i devotes to q, and  is the proportion of total 
relational strength that contact j devotes to contact q. We used UCINET 6 software to calculate 
the network constraint score. Structural Holes is measured as 1 minus the network constraint 
score, with larger scores denoting more structural holes. We asked a series of additional 
questions about each contact in each network (e.g., how many years the respondent has known 
each contact, the gender of each contact, and the nature of each tie, such as family). 
Dependent variable. We use revenue growth as a proxy for venture performance because 
it is a common measure of the success of new ventures (Baum, Locke, & Smith, 2001) and is 
more appropriate than alternative measures in cross-country and cross-industry comparative 
contexts (Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992). In the interview, we asked for revenue growth 
information for the four years prior to the time of the telephone survey. Revenue growth is the 
difference between sales in two consecutive years divided by sales one year earlier. The variable 
Revenue growth is the sum of revenue growth percentages divided by the number of revenue 
years. 
Control variables. We control for firm age, measured as years since the date of founding, 
and firm size, measured as the number of full-time employees. We control for demographic 
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attributes and human capital of the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneur’s age is measured in years, and 
Entrepreneur’s education is measured as 1 when the entrepreneur’s education is less than an 
undergraduate degree, 2 when the entrepreneur has an undergraduate degree, 3 when the degree 
is a Master’s, and 4 when the degree is a doctorate. We control for Entrepreneur’s gender using 
a dummy variable (Woman=1). Entrepreneur’s managerial experience is the number of years 
the entrepreneur worked as a manager before starting the new venture. We control for network 
size, network density, and composition (women and family ties) in order to estimate the net 
effect of structural holes. Network size is the sum of the number of contacts named in the three 
networks. Network density measures the extent to which contacts (alters) are connected to each 
other (Marsden, 1990). This variable is calculated by dividing the total number of identified 
relationships between the alters by the total possible number of ties, which for an undirected 
graph is: 
 
where  is 1 indicating the existence of a close relationship between i and j, 0.5 indicating the 
existence of neither close nor distant relationship, and 0 indicating the absence of relationship, 
and N is the number of contacts (alters). The Women ties variable is measured as the percentage 
of women in an entrepreneur’s network. The Family ties variable is measured as the percentage 
of kin in an entrepreneur’s network. Proxies for the industry environment, industry dynamism 
and munificence, were measured using Keats and Hitt’s (1988) method. First, each new venture 
was coded on industry affiliation: trade, service, IT/software, biotechnology/pharmaceuticals, or 
light manufacturing. Munificence is measured as the growth in revenues in each of the above 
industries, that is, the regression slope coefficient of revenues for the period 2000-2004 (for five 
years in each industry). Dynamism is measured as the variation in revenues over this time period 
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in each industry, that is, the standard error of the regression slope coefficient of revenues. This 
figure is then divided by the industry mean in revenues in order to standardize the values across 
industries. These two variables were used as manifest variables of a latent variable Industry 
reflecting industry environment. The data sources used to gather revenue data for China, Russia, 
France, and the U.S. are listed in Appendix C. Finally, we control for national culture because it 
affects formal institutions as well as entrepreneurial activities (Holmes et al., 2012). To measure 
culture in each country, we used data from the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior 
Effectiveness project (GLOBE) (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). 
Specifically, we used in-group collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and gender 
egalitarianism as cultural practice variables. These four variables were used as manifest 
variables of a latent control variable Culture. The higher scores mean greater collectivism, power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance, and lower gender egalitarianism. 
Data Validity 
We conducted validation checks on our data. In the U.S. sample, validation was 
performed on a randomly selected group of 34 entrepreneurs from the sample. For this group, we 
re-administered the survey, on average, three months following the initial survey to determine 
the reliability of the entrepreneurs’ responses. We found the agreement between the initial and 
follow-up data to be more than 80 percent for venture characteristics such as firm size, firm age, 
and revenue growth. Follow-up questions suggested that the few differences were related to 
actual changes in the venture (e.g., further growth in revenue or personnel). In France, we re-
interviewed 11 of the sampled entrepreneurs, 10 percent of the French sample, on average, two 
months after the initial data collection. We asked the same questions and found 95 percent 
agreement on networks, venture characteristics, and revenue across the interviews. 
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 In China and Russia, we used a different procedure to validate the data. By selecting 
every fifth or sixth entrepreneur in our samples, we created lists of 15 women-owned and 15 
men-owned ventures in each country. We submitted revenue growth data of 30 Beijing-based 
firms to the Government Tax Bureau in Beijing and 30 Russian firms to the Taxation 
Department of the Moscow City Government for the cities where these ventures operate. We 
asked government officials to confirm if our data were consistent with their data. We received 
confirmation that our revenue growth data for 27 Chinese firms (90 percent) and 24 Russian 
firms (80 percent) were consistent with the data in the respective tax offices. Social network data 
were validated through interviews. We asked for the telephone number of one of the contacts 
listed in the business resource networks. We obtained telephone phone numbers for 18 contacts 
in China and 12 contacts in Russia. We telephoned these contacts and validated the 
entrepreneurs’ responses. We asked these contacts’ functional background and relational base - 
“How did you get to know this person?” The responses of 17 Chinese contacts (94 percent) and 
10 Russian contacts (83 percent) were consistent with the data we obtained in the survey from 
the entrepreneurs. According to James, Demaree, and Wolfe (1984), an agreement of at least 80 
percent between multiple raters is necessary to establish reliability. The evidence from our 
validation procedures suggests that the network and revenue growth data are reliable in all four 
samples. 
Analyses 
 Before hypothesis testing, we performed additional data quality checks. First, we 
examined the data for outliers. Using scatterplots, casewise diagnostics, and Cook’s distance 
analysis (Cook, 1979), we found three outliers in the relationship between network size and 
revenue growth. These outliers were excluded from further analyses. Second, some entrepreneurs 
 
 
29 
 
were reluctant to provide revenue growth data, resulting in 21 percent of the sample having 
missing data on the major dependent variable. Following Little and Rubin’s (2002) guideline, we 
used the mean revenue growth of each country to substitute for missing data in that country. 
Analyses using the sample both with and without the mean substitution yielded similar results. 
We reported the results using the sample with mean substitution to conserve sample size and 
maintain statistical power.6 
 We used Partial Least Squares (PLS) to analyze the data for hypotheses testing because it 
calculates the confluence of multiple institutions by differentially weighting the four institutional 
factors. As a modeling approach, PLS has been used in management research fruitfully 
(Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009; Hulland, 1999). In contrast to covariance-based structural 
equation modeling such as LISREL, PLS is a component-based structural equation modeling 
approach (Esposito Vinzi, Chin, Henseler, & Wang, 2010). The main advantages of PLS are that 
it makes less stringent assumptions about the distribution of the variables and is able to estimate 
complex models with many latent and manifest variables such as our institutional and culture 
variables (Chin, 2010; Hulland, 1999; Shamir, Zakay, & Popper, 1998). The results of PLS 
analyses are evaluated considering the composite reliability, average extracted variance, R 
square, and bootstrap for the t-values (Chin, 2010; Henseler et al., 2009; Hulland, 1999). 
Therefore, we chose PLS considering the measures of institutions, culture, and industry, and the 
relatively fewer variations in the country-level variables. We used SmartPLS software to carry 
out the analyses (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005). 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations of all study 
variables. The average firm size is 36 full-time employees (SD=61.5). Twenty-five percent of the 
6  The results of the analyses without mean substitution are available upon request. 
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ventures were in IT, software, and biotechnology industries, 46 percent were in trade and 
services, and the remaining 29 percent were in other industries. The average age of the 
entrepreneurs was 39 years (SD=8.5). The mean network size was 5.7 contacts (SD=2.5), and the 
mean structural holes score was 0.49 (SD=0.21). The finding on the mean network size is 
consistent with the findings of previous surveys of ego-centric networks in the general 
population (Marsden, 1990; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Brashears, 2006) and of entrepreneurs 
(Aldrich, Reese & Dubini, 1989; Batjargal, 2007c). The average revenue growth was 36 percent 
(SD=61). 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson’s Correlations of Study Variables 
 
  N Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Regulatory 
control 637 .74 1.06 
            
2 Political 
democracy 637 1.15 1.81 
-.93**            
3 Market 
liquidity 637 .48 1.28 
-.85** .90**           
4 Capital 
availability 637 2.48 2.53 
-.79** .53** .56**          
5 Collectivism 637 5.25 .72 .99** -.95** -.86** -.74**         
6 Power 
distance 637 5.26 .33 
.28** .08* .04 -.79** .21**        
7 Gender 
egalitarianism 637 3.51 .42 
.05 .27** .40** -.51** .01 .88**       
8 Uncertainty 
avoidance 637 4.16 .70 
-.18** -.00 -.35** .29** -.17** -.50** -.80**      
9 China 637 .32 .46 .54** -.75** -.87** -.09* .57** -.51** -.79** .64**     
10 Russia 637 .27 .44 .50** -.28** .01 -.59** .48** .63** .79** -.93** -.41**    
11 France 637 .16 .37 -.30** .52** .17** -.25** -.36** .56** .30** .31** -.30** -.27**   
12 United States 637 .24 .42 -.84** .65** .78** .94** -.80** -.59** -.21** -.00 -.39** -.35** -.25**  
13 Trade 637 .19 .39 .17** -.15** -.12** -.16** .17** .09* .06 -.08* .04 .13** -.04 -.15** 
14 Service 
industry 637 .27 .44 
-.25** .21** .18** .21** -.24** -.11** -.06 .09* -.08* -.17** .07 .21** 
15 IT industry 637 .17 .37 .19** -.19** -.22** -.15** .19** .02 -.07 .08* .18** -.00 .00 -.19** 
16 Biotech 
industry 637 .03 .17 
.09* -.07* -.05 -.09* .09* .06 .05 -.06 .01 .09* -.03 -.08* 
17 Software 
industry 637 .05 .22 
.09* -.07* -.06 -.07 .08* .04 .03 -.04 .02 .07 -.03 -.07 
18 Other 
industries 637 .29 .44 
-.15** .15** .17** .13** -.15** -.03 .03 -.04 -.13** -.01 .00 .15** 
18 Industry 
munificence 535 8089 
1707
3 
-.81** .64** .71** .86** -.78** -.45** -.13** .02 -.35** -.30** -.11** .93** 
20 Industry 
dynamism 535 .04 .04 
-.15** .10* .31** .26** -.13** -.13** .10* -.32** -.23** .20** -.38** .39** 
21 Firm age 637 4.46 2.2 .27** -.26** -.15** -.17** .28** .05 .07 -.21** .07 .26** -.23** -.14** 
22  Firm size 637 35.73 61.50 
.32** -.34** -.31** -.17** .33** -.03 -.10* .00 .26** .09* -.18** -.22** 
23 Entrepreneur’s 
age 633 38.75 8.54 
-.21** .15** .21** -.27** -.20** -.20** -.06 -.04 -.10** -.06 -.13** .29** 
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24 Entrepreneur’s 
education 637 2.14 .75 
-.19** .22** .11** .04 -.20** .06 .01 .16** -.08* -.17** .28** .03 
25 Entrepreneur’s 
managerial 
experience 
633 5.81 6.84 
-.37** .28** .27** .40** -.36** -.28** -.18** .14** -.08* -.27** -.02 .39** 
26 Entrepreneur’s 
gender 
(Man=1) 
637 .56 .49 
-.13** .14** .10** .06 -.14** .01 .01 .05 -.07* -.08* .11** .07 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 
 
  N Mean S.D. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
27 Network size 637 5.71 2.51 .14** .22** .16** .05 .16** -.21** -.19** .03 .22** -.01 -.27** .00 
28 Network 
density 637 .42 .27 
.32** .27** .16** -.27** .32** .16** .17** -.27** .02 .35** -.18** -.22** 
29 Network 
structural 
holes 
637 .49 .21 
-.02 .06 .04 .15** -.01 -.23** -.20** .10** .14** -.12** -.16** .10** 
30 Women ties 
% 632 .31 .24 
-.13** -.12** -.12** .12** -.13** -.05 -.01 -.05 -.07 -.05 .01 .13** 
31 Family ties % 632 .18 .21 -.25** -.30** -.19** .05 -.27** .12** .08* -.02 -.18** -.15** .33** .06 
32 Revenue 
growth % 637 35.94 60.75 
-.42** .34** .32** .43** -.41** -.27** -.15** .14** -.12** -.28** .01 .42** 
 
 
  13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
14 Service 
industry 
-.30**             
15 IT industry -.22** -.27**            
16 Biotech 
industry 
-.08* -.11** -.08*           
17 Software 
industry 
-.11** -.14** -.11** -.04          
18 Other 
industries 
-.30** -.37** -.28** -
.11** 
-.14**         
19 Industry 
munificence 
-.14** .41** -.14** -.00 -.03 -.18**        
20 Industry 
dynamism 
-.21** -.15** .32** -.03 .29** -.09* .34**       
21 Firm age .04 -.08* .07 .07 .05 -.07 -.16** .11*
* 
     
22  Firm size -.05 -.08* .02 .05 .03 .06 -.20** -.02 .26**     
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23 Entrepreneur’s 
age 
-.08* .16** -.12** .04 -.05 .02 .28** .1* .14** .09*    
24 Entrepreneur’s 
education 
-.30** -.02 .13** .19** .15** .02 .03 .08 -.08* 
.05 .01 
  
25 Entrepreneur’s 
managerial 
experience 
-.13** .23** -.08* -.03 -.05 .00 .42** .09* -.12** -.03 .57** .06  
26 Entrepreneur’s 
gender 
(Man=1) 
-.14** -.03 .04 -.02 .03 .12** .06 .05 -.07* .07 .04 .1** .1** 
27 Network size -.06 .02 -.01 .07 .07* -.03 -.04 .04 .01 .21** .1* .08* .09* 
28 Network 
density 
.13** -.06 .00 .00 -.03 -.04 -.26** -.02 .12** .01 -.08* -.17** -.16** 
29 Network 
structural 
holes 
-.08* .02 -.00 .06 .02 .01 .06 .06 -.01 .18** .10** .10** .10** 
30 Women ties % .03 .04 .01 .01 -.13** -.00 .00 .01 -.00 .01 .00 -.05 .01 
31 Family ties % .02 .04 .01 .04 -.15** .01 -.00 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.00 -.02 -.01 
32 Revenue 
growth % 
-.17** .06 -.06 -.01 -.02 .16** .42** .09* -.22** -.10* -.03 .09* .17** 
 
 
 
 
  26 27 28 29 30 31 
27 Network size -.11**      
28 Network 
density 
-.05 -.02     
29 Network 
structural 
holes 
-.05 .67** -.47**    
30 Women ties 
% 
-.15** .19** .13** .18**   
31 Family ties % -.05 .16** .14** .15** .24**  
32 Revenue 
growth % 
.12** .06 -.17** .12** -.02 -.00 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
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Table 2 illustrates the convergent and discriminant validity analyses for the PLS models explaining network’s structural holes 
and revenue growth of new ventures. The results indicate that institutions as an independent variable and industry and culture as 
control variables present strong convergent and discriminant validity. 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity Analyses for PLS Models explaining Structural Holes and Revenue Growth 
 
 Constructs (Models explaining 
Structural holes) Composite Reliability 
  Constructs (Models explaining 
Revenue growth) Composite Reliability 
Culture 0.84  Culture 0.82 
Industry 0.80  Industry 0.75 
Institutions 0.70  Institutions 0.95 
 
  Culture Industry Institutions    Culture Industry Institutions 
Culture 0.63      Culture 0.61     
Industry 0.02 0.68   Industry 0.28 0.62   
Institutions 0.40 0.12 0.52  Institutions 0.37 0.49 0.82 
Firm age 0.01  0.00  0.00  Firm age 0.05  0.01  0.06 
Firm size 0.00 0.02 0.00  Firm size 0.02 0.03 0.09 
Entrepreneur’s age 0.01  0.04 0.04  Entrepreneur’s age 0.04 0.06  0.06 
Entrepreneur’s 
education 0.00 0.00  0.00 
 Entrepreneur’s 
education 0.01  0.00  0.02 
Entrepreneur’s 
managerial 
experience 
0.06  0.08  0.08 
 Entrepreneur’s 
managerial 
experience  
0.14 0.14 0.14 
Entrepreneur’s 0.00 0.00 0.00  Entrepreneur’s 0.00 0.00 0.01 
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gender (Woman=1) gender (Woman=1) 
Network size 0.03 0.00 0.04  Network density 0.12 0.05 0.08 
Woman ties % 0.00 0.00 0.00  Network structural holes 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Family ties % 0.00 0.00 0.01  Women ties % 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Network density 0.04 0.03 0.03  Family ties % 0.01 0.00 0.04 
 
Values in bold show the average variance extracted (AVE) by constructs. The other values are the squared correlations (Chin, 2010). 
 
 
 
Table 3 shows the results for the four hypotheses. Models 1 and 2 examine the effects of the confluence of weak and 
inefficient institutions on a network’s structural holes. Model 1 is the base model for structural holes with control variables. Model 2 
includes the effects of the confluence of formal institutions and shows a statistically significant positive effect on structural holes 
(b=0.15, p<0.05), providing support for Hypothesis 1. 
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TABLE 3 
Standardized Path (Regression) Coefficients from Partial Least Squares Analysis Predicting  
Structural Holes and Revenue Growth 
 Structural holes 
 
Revenue Growth 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Firm age 0.00 -0.00 -0.10** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** 
Firm size 0.04** 0.04* 0.00 0.07** 0.04* 0.03 
Entrepreneur’s age 0.01 0.00 -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.17*** 
Entrepreneur’s 
education 
-0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.01 
Entrepreneur’s 
managerial experience 
-0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Network size 0.64*** 0.64***     
Women ties % -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Family ties % -0.08* -0.07* 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 
Network density -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.01 -0.00 0.04 0.06† 
Entrepreneur’s gender 
(Woman=1) 
0.02 0.02 0.07† 0.04 -0.05* -0.05 
Culture (composite) 0.01 0.14* -0.30*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.16*** 
Industry (composite) 0.01 -0.02 0.12* -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
       
Institutions (composite) 
(H1; H2) 
 0.15*  -0.32*** -0.33*** -0.51*** 
Structural holes (H3)     0.10* 0.12** 
Institutions * Structural 
holes (H4) 
     0.18** 
       
R square 0.65 0.68 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.27 
Significance in R square 
change 
 0.04  0.00 0.01 0.00 
  †p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 Model 3 is the base model for revenue growth with controls. Due to the high correlation 
between network size and structural holes (r=.67, p<.001), the former was excluded as a control 
in the testing of H2 to H4. Model 4 includes the effects of the confluence of weak institutions on 
revenue growth and shows a statistically significant negative effect on revenue growth (b=-0.32, 
p<0.001). Thus, Hypothesis 2 receives support. Model 5 reveals that the main effect of network’s 
structural holes on revenue growth is positive and statistically significant (b=0.10, p<0.05). 
These results provide support for Hypothesis 3. Model 6 examines the two-way interaction 
effects of institutional confluence and structural holes on revenue growth. The results show that 
the interaction effect is positive and statistically significant (b= 0.18, p<0.01). These results 
provide support for Hypothesis 4. 
Robustness Checks 
We conducted several additional analyses to check the robustness of the results. An 
important concern in entrepreneurship research is sample selection bias (Djankov et al., 2006). 
Therefore, we performed the Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation procedure to determine if the 
effects of the independent and moderator variables on revenue growth, as shown in Table 3, are 
robust. In the first stage of this procedure, the inverse Mills ratio (lambda) was calculated using 
the total sample of the surveyed firms and the non-surveyed firms. The non-surveyed firms are 
the ventures that meet our sampling criteria but did not respond to our requests or that we were 
unable to reach them. We dummy-coded the surveyed firms as one and used this variable as the 
dependent variable in a probit model.7 We used firm age, the trade/service dummy, and 
interaction of firm age and the trade/service dummy as the independent variables in the probit 
7  Because of the lack of data on non-surveyed firms in France and the U.S., the test was conducted using 
those from Chinese (N=612) and Russian (N=480) firms. Therefore, we calculated the inverse Mills’ ratio using 
only the Chinese and Russian data. The non-surveyed firm data from France and the U.S. are incomplete and 
sketchy due to the minor differences in the data collection procedures. 
 
                                                 
 model because we have information on these variables in both the surveyed firms and the non-
surveyed firms.8 Then, the inverse Mills ratio was inserted into second-stage PLS regression 
models where the dependent variable is revenue growth, as a control variable. The inverse Mills 
ratio removes any potential bias due to sample selection and endogeneity (Hitt, Bierman, 
Uhlenbruck, & Shimizu, 2006). Following the Heckman procedure, we excluded firm age and 
the trade/service dummy in the second-stage model in estimating new venture revenue growth. 
The results in Table 4 show that our findings are robust when we include the inverse Mills ratio 
as a control.9 These findings suggest that the original results are not subject to sample selection 
bias. 
8  We have information on gender and firm location. However, it would be inappropriate to use these two 
variables to test sample selection bias because we deliberately oversampled women, and female entrepreneurs are 
distributed differently in various locations. 
9  We have to use the total sample of 637 in the second stage (Table 4) because the regression results of the 
subsample of China and Russia (N=377) would be very different from the total sample due to the institutions 
hypotheses. 
 
                                                 
 TABLE 4  
Standardized Path (Regression) Coefficients from Partial Least Squares Analysis 
Predicting Revenue Growth –Heckman’s Two-stage Estimation Procedure 
 
 Model 1 
 
Firm size -0.00 
Entrepreneur’s age -0.16*** 
Entrepreneur’s education -0.01 
Entrepreneur’s managerial 
experience 
0.06 
Network density 0.05 
Women ties % -0.03 
Family ties % 0.02 
Culture (composite) -0.13*** 
Industry (composite) 0.02 
Entrepreneur’s gender (Woman=1) -0.06† 
Inverse Mills ratio (Lambda) 0.18** 
Institutions (composite) -0.39** 
Structural holes 0.16*** 
Institutions * Structural holes 0.23** 
  
†p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; N=637 
 
 
  According to Stuart and Sorenson (2007), the cause-effect problem of networks versus 
venture performance in entrepreneurship research is a potential concern. Therefore, we 
conducted additional tests to ensure that the results do not suffer from reverse causality. Using 
the collected information on the duration of each respondent-alter (contact named) tie, we 
estimated the average dyadic ego-alter (ego is the respondent, and alter is the contact) tie age for 
each respondent – the sum of years known of each alter divided by the number of alters. The data 
showed that the sample mean of dyadic tie age for advice networks is 9.52 years (SD=7.12), for 
business resource networks is 7.8 years (SD=6.00), and for emotional support networks is 16.25 
years (SD=10.08), and for the overall networks is 11.14 years (SD=5.69). In comparison, the 
mean firm age is 4.4 years (SD=2.20) (Table 1). These data indicate that the entrepreneurs knew 
 
 most contacts well before (i.e., 6.7 years on average) they started their ventures. Thus, the large 
time gap between tie cultivation and venture creation enables us to assume that networks 
influenced venture performance rather than venture performance affected network structure and 
composition. 
DISCUSSION 
The findings suggest that the confluence of multiple weak and inefficient institutions is  
associated with entrepreneurs having larger numbers of structural holes in their social networks. 
Such an institutional order also has a direct negative effect on new venture growth. A network’s 
structural holes facilitate the revenue growth of new venture firms. Further, the confluence of 
weak and inefficient institutions enhances the effect of structural holes on new venture success. 
Thus, the results of this study suggest that the effects of a network’s structural holes on new 
ventures’ revenue growth are influenced by the strength and efficiency of multiple formal 
institutions. Structural holes operate as a substitute for weak and inefficient rules and as a 
protection against destructive multiple institutional forces. These entrepreneurs benefit from their 
network’s structural holes. However, those entrepreneurs who operate in settings where the 
entire institutional order is adverse and uncertain benefit more from their networks’ structural 
holes. The results offer new and nuanced insights into the role of social networks for 
entrepreneurs operating in polycentric weak and inefficient institutional orders. 
This research provides evidence of the contingent nature of both formal institutions and 
social networks for entrepreneurial success. In particular, it suggests that the concept of 
multiplicity as a part of institutional polycentrism plays an important role in the value of 
entrepreneurs’ social networks for achieving success. Furthermore, the entrepreneurial networks 
serve different functions in different institutional orders. For example, we found that the 
 
 institutional multiplicity characterized as the confluence of political, regulatory, and economic 
institutions had strong influences on both the social networks employed by entrepreneurs and on 
new venture growth. Additionally, when the combination of weak and inefficient institutions 
creates an adverse institutional order, lower-level informal institutions and networks (e.g., 
personal networks) become more important, suggesting the importance of institutional 
multiplicity and substitution as core concepts of the institutional polycentrism theory. 
This research extends our understanding of institutional polycentrism, showing the joint 
effects of the confluence of formal institutions (or lack of) and informal networks. And, 
importantly the effects of polycentric institutions also extend to entrepreneurial ventures. Finally, 
this research extends our understanding of social network theory, suggesting that institutional 
rules influence the use of and outcomes from entrepreneurs’ social networks (Granovetter, 1995). 
The theoretical framework developed and tested is original and scientifically useful in a 
number of ways. This is one of the first studies in management and entrepreneurship to employ 
the concepts of institutional multiplicity and institutional substitution from the theory of 
institutional polycentrism. Therefore, the theoretical perspective advances our knowledge of 
polycentric institutions and polycentric institutional orders. Further, this study is one of the first 
to theorize and empirically examine the interactive influence of multiple types of formal 
institutions and personal networks on entrepreneurial outcomes (Brass et al., 2004; Owen-Smith 
& Powell, 2008) showing the influence of multi-type institutions and networks on firm 
outcomes. Integrating two important research perspectives, namely, institutional polycentrism 
theory and social network theory, enhances our understanding of the contingencies and contexts 
in which firms and entrepreneurs must operate. As a whole, the theoretical framework serves as a 
catalyst to open new directions in institution-based and network research. 
 
 The national institutional orders in China and Russia remain highly inefficient and weak 
resulting in negative synergies, conflicts and contradictions, and deterioration (Batjargal, 2010; 
Nee, 2005; Shleifer, 2005; Xu, 2011). Hence, guanxi (connections) networks in China and svyazi 
(connections) networks in Russia serve as functional substitutes for formal institutions and as a 
protection against dysfunctional institutions (Djankov et al., 2006). This study confirms the 
importance of the structure of these two types of networks, respectively. Our study further 
confirms that even in strong institutional settings (such as U.S. and France), networks’ structural 
holes still offer the potential for positive returns to entrepreneurs. 
This study focused on three types of formal institutions at one level. Future research 
should examine functional (what it does), process (how it performs and evolves) and normative 
(how it should be) aspects of multi-source, multi-code, multi-level, multi-type, multi-sectoral and 
multi-functional rules and norms. In particular, investigation of the relationships of multiple rules 
at the national versus local level, regulatory versus informal rules, and the different structures 
and compositions of networks is a promising direction for future research.  
The institutional configuration processes (e.g., rule complementarity) should also be 
examined. Because polycentric institutions are dynamic, the centers of power and authority can 
change over time. Therefore, the causes and consequences of changing polycentric rules should 
be studied (Ostrom & Basurto, 2010). Moreover, context-specific rules and norms should be 
identified and analyzed (Ostrom, 1990). 
The current study focuses on institutions at the national level. Some may argue that 
institutions at the local level may have a greater influence on entrepreneurship than that at the 
national level. However, national rules and prescriptions embedded in local knowledge and 
 
 situations can be complementary to higher level formal institutional arrangements (Ostrom, 
2005).  
Further, polycentric institutional arrangements enable local actors to design unique 
problem-solving rules and avoid being caught between a false dilemma of “the state” and “the 
market” (Ostrom, 2010; Ostrom & Walker, 2000). On the other hand, highly decentralized and 
overlapping rules may cause confusion, spread resources thinly, and trigger conflicts among 
competing institutional actors such as national versus local bureaucracies (Green, 2007; V. 
Ostrom, 1999a). It is possible that polycentric institutions have inverse U-shaped effects on 
certain outcomes due to both the advantages and disadvantages that polycentric prescriptions 
generate.  
The development and validation of comprehensive empirical measures of institutional 
polycentrism are crucial for our understanding of polycentric governance. Further, the 
differences and similarities between well-established concepts such as institutional complexity 
and institutional pluralism on the one hand, and institutional polycentrism on the other hand 
require further investigation. Various types of polycentrism such as political, legal, market, 
regional, cultural, and network polycentrism should be examined and used to frame research 
questions (Green, 2007; V. Ostrom, 1999b). 
At a broad level, our research indicates that institutional polycentricity influences how 
entrepreneurs network to support their growth objectives. Various institutional centers each 
prescribe rules that govern economic activity, and entrepreneurs can leverage strategies to 
respond to the challenges and incentives imposed by those rules. This research complements the 
extant research suggesting that institutional polycentricity influences the domain of activity 
pursued by entrepreneurs. More specifically, as the jurisdictions of multiple institutional centers 
 
 overlap, each center can impose prescriptions that are aligned with its own specific objectives 
but that conflict with the objectives and, therefore, prescriptions of other institutional centers 
(Webb, Bruton, Tihanyi, & Ireland, 2012). Conflict across institutional centers creates 
ambiguities at the institutional level as to what defines legitimate behaviors and outcomes 
(Fernandez-Kelly, 2006), thereby undermining enforcement and surfacing opportunities in the 
informal economy for entrepreneurs to exploit. While our findings suggest that some 
entrepreneurs can exploit network strategies to substitute for a confluence of weak institutions in 
growing their ventures, this extant research also suggests that in other cases entrepreneurs may 
view the confluence of weak institutions as conferring minimal benefits for operating in the 
formal economy, motivating and enabling them to pursue opportunities in the informal economy 
instead. 
We included three types of networks in this study: business resource, advice, and 
emotional support. Post-hoc analysis shows that there is a slightly larger number of ties in the 
advice networks (mean=2.21) relative to business resource networks (mean=1.74) and emotional 
support networks (mean=1.84). Further analysis shows that both advice networks and emotional 
support networks positively relate to revenue growth (r=0.18, p<0.01 and r=0.12, p<0.01, 
respectively), but interestingly business resource networks are not related to growth. Perhaps 
members of advice networks provide strategic information that is important for the development 
of the venture while resources networks do not offer a competitive advantage (perhaps the 
resources provided are necessary for competitive parity). Access to and obtaining resources may 
be necessary for gaining legitimacy and survival by new ventures. Future research should 
systematically test the effects of these different networks as well as explore other types of 
networks (e.g., mentor, political aid, or international networks) and the relational base of these 
 
 networks (e.g., education, profession, or family) as possible factors associated with network 
returns. Recently, scholars have suggested that the content and process of social exchange may 
vary across cultures (Shore, Coyle-Shapiro, Chen, & Tetrick, 2009). For example, the role of 
social networks may differ in Confucian cultures (Chai & Rhee, 2010). In this study, the latent 
culture variable has a negative effect on the revenue growth of the new ventures. Unpacking the 
effect of culture and the exchange process within social networks in different cultures would 
contribute to further theoretical refinements in network research as well as provide additional 
understanding of how entrepreneurs build, maintain, and derive benefits from their networks. 
Limitations 
This study has several limitations. First, we relied on slightly different methods to obtain 
the samples and to verify the data quality in the four countries. While these small differences 
were dictated by the contexts in which the data were collected, they might introduce some error 
variance. However, if such error exists, we found no evidence of systematic effects on the 
results. Second, the sample may be composed of ventures that survived. However, the potential 
for bias in this study is not severe for the following reasons. The research objective was to 
compare the financial performance of new ventures rather than examine venture survival. 
Previous research indicates that financial performance does not predict survival of new firms in 
all contexts because some financially sound ventures are discontinued while other financially 
distressed ventures survive longer. This conclusion is particularly applicable to firms in 
emerging economies (Lyles, Saxton, & Watson, 2004). In addition, we control for firm age, 
which has a negative effect on revenue growth (Table 3; Models 3-6). We checked firm age 
distribution, and found that it is not skewed toward older firms. This outcome indirectly indicates 
that the sample does not suffer from survivor bias. Third, we compared new ventures in terms of 
 
 revenue growth, which is not the only indicator for entrepreneurial success. Use of other 
performance indicators, such as employment growth or product development, might produce 
different outcomes. 
CONCLUSION 
By extending the newly emerging literature on institutional polycentrism, this study 
contributes to institutional theory, comparative entrepreneurship research, and social network 
theory. Of particular importance are the contributions to our knowledge of entrepreneurship in 
polycentric institutional orders. To the extent that new venture creation and development is 
important to the economic development in countries globally, the present study provides a 
contribution to both theory and practice in the field of entrepreneurship. Social networks, as 
sources of business resources, advice, and emotional support, are especially important when the 
confluence of multiple weak and inefficient institutions creates an adverse institutional order for 
entrepreneurs. This work is inter-disciplinary and has important implications for research on the 
effects of polycentric institutions, and on the effects of networks in the success of new ventures. 
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 APPENDIX A: 
Institutional Variables by Data Source a 
 
• Freedom House: Civil liberties index, Political rights 
• International Country Risk Guide:  Corruption 
• Index of Economic Freedom (Gwartney, Lawson, & Block, 1996): Contract and property 
rights, Fiscal burden, Foreign investment restrictions, Government control over wages 
and prices, Government intervention in banking, Government restrictions on industry, 
Informal market, Monetary policy, Regulatory Burden, Trade policy 
• POLCON:  Executive political restrictions, Political constraints 
• Political Risk Services: Government budget balance, Capital investment, Change in real 
wages, Credit transfers, Exchange rate, Debt service cost, Industry work force, Inflation 
rate, Liabilities, Liquidity, Money supply, Net reserves, Nominal GDP, Size of 
population, Services work force, Trade balance, Total foreign debt, Unemployment rate, 
Unionized work force 
• World Bank’s World Development Indicators: Value of stocks traded 
 
a Please see Holmes et al. (2012) for more information on institutional variables and their 
transformations and definitions. 
 
  
 
 
 APPENDIX B: 
Institutional Measurements: Results of Factor Analysis a 
 
     
Factor Item Factor Loading 
Political Democracy Political constraints 0.96 
 Political rights -0.87 
 Civil liberties -0.76 
 Executive political restrictions 0.68 
Regulatory Control Regulatory burden 0.80 
 Contract and property rights 0.79 
 Trade policy 0.77 
 Informal markets 0.77 
 Government intervention in banking 0.77 
 Foreign investment restrictions 0.75 
 Monetary policy 0.58 
Capital Availability Money supply 0.96 
 Capital investments 0.94 
 Total foreign debt 0.93 
 Nominal GDP 0.89 
 Budget balance -0.73 
 Net reserves 0.71 
Market Liquidity Liabilities 0.78 
 Liquidity -0.72 
 Exchange rate 0.64 
   
 Total Proportion of Variance 
Explained 70.8 
 
a Please see Holmes et al. (2012) for complete exploratory factor analysis with all factor 
loadings. 
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APPENDIX C: 
Industry Sales Data Sources 
 
a. Sources of the Chinese Industry Data: The sales data for retail trade, wholesale trade, service, IT 
industry, biotechnology, and light manufacturing for 2000-2004 were collected from the following 
sources: China Statistical Yearbook – 1999; China Statistical Yearbook – 2000; China Statistical 
Yearbook – 2001; China Statistical Yearbook – 2002; China Statistical Yearbook – 2003; China 
Statistical Yearbook – 2004; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Tongji Ju (The National Bureau 
of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China), website: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata Accessed: April 20, 2010. 
b. The sales data for the software industry for 2000-2004 were collected from the following sources: 
Software and Information Service Industries are Beijing’s Advantageous Industries, Beijingshi 
Kexue Jishu Weiyuanhui (Beijing Municipal Science & Technology Commission), website: 
http://www.bjkw.gov.cn/htm/ztrd_zxgz/zxgz090508/niguangnan2.html Accessed: May 5, 2010. 
c. Sources of the Russian Industry Data: The sales data for retail and wholesale trade for 2000-2004 
were collected from the following sources: Torgovlya v Rossii (Trade in Russia), 2005 (1): 1-11; 
Vorposy Statistiki (Problems of Statistics), 2006 (3): 66-77; 2006 (5): 87-93; 2006 (6): 72-83; 2006 
(10): 82-83; 2007 (1): 83-94; 2007 (3): 82-93; 2007 (10): 60-71; Federal’naya Sluzhba 
Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki, (Federal State Statistics Service, Russian Federation). 
d. The sales data for the service industry for 2000-2004 were collected from the following sources: 
Statisticheskoe Obozrenie (Current Statistical Survey), 2000 (1); 2001 (1); 2002 (1): 43-45; 2003 (1); 
2004 (1): 64-66; 2005 (1): 64-66; Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki, (Federal State 
Statistics Service, Russian Federation). 
e. The sales data for the IT and software industries for 2000-2004 were collected from the following 
sources: Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik (Russian Statistical Annuals), 2004 (1): 555-560; 2005 
(1); Russia in Figures, 2002 (1): 269-285; 2003 (1): 267-283; Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi 
Statistiki, (Federal State Statistics Service, Russian Federation). 
f. The sales data for the biotech industry for 2000-2004 were collected from the following sources: 
Promyshlennost’ v Rossii (Industries in Russia), 2005 (1); Russia in Figures, 2001 (1); Federal’naya 
Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki, (Federal State Statistics Service, Russian Federation). 
g. The sales data for the light manufacturing industry were collected from the following sources: 
Statisticheskoe Obozrenie (Current Statistical Survey), 2002 (1): 23-33; 2003 (1); 2004 (1): 39-50; 
2005 (1): 39-50; 2005 (4); Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki, (Federal State Statistics 
Service, Russian Federation). 
h. Sources of the French Industry Data: The sales data were collected from the Eurostat online 
database on European industries. Website: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database Accessed: January 5, 
2010. 
I.    Sources of the US Industry Data: Industry sales data for the United States were gathered from 
Compustat North America. Website: www.compustat.com Accessed: June 1, 2010. 
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